

EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE IN
URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS, by MAJ Jeffrey C. Schrick, 98 pages.

This thesis analyzes the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion. The methodology attempts to assess the organic intelligence assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion, the training of the maneuver battalion officers on the employment of intelligence assets, and the availability of doctrinal literature about urban operations. The war in Iraq presents the Army with an operational environment that is unfamiliar to a force that has trained for conventional warfare in open terrain. The commanders, especially at battalion level and below, need an efficient and effective intelligence system.

The focus of the research will be on the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level. The FM 3-0, *Operations*, dated February 2008, is the capstone doctrine for the U.S. Army for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for future prolonged conflicts as an expeditionary force. Discussion among the maneuver and intelligence communities on how to improve the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments is worthy of research. The historic perspective of the urban environment complexities and their military significance provide lessons learned on how military intelligence plays an important role in successful operations in such terrain.

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
AO	Area of Operations
ARC	Army Reconnaissance Course
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
BOLC	Basic Officer Leader Course
C2	Command and Control
CAB	Combined Arms Battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CCIR	Commanders Critical Information Requirement
CCMET	Core Capabilities Mission Essential Tasks
CFV	Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CLC	Cavalry Leaders Course
CMETL	Core Mission Essential Task List
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COP	Common Operating Picture
DP	Displaced Personnel
FBCB2	Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below
FTX	Field Training Exercise

GCT	Ground Cavalry Troop
GMET	General Mission Essential Tasks
HBCT	Heavy Brigade Combat Team
HHT	Headquarters and Headquarters Company
HMMWV	Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HN	Host Nation
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IR	Information Requirement
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
LRAS3	Long Range Scout Surveillance System
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MICO	Military Intelligence Company
MOI	Memorandum of Instruction
MOUT	Missions on Urban Terrain
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MTT	Military Training Teams
NCOES	Non-Commissioned Officer Education System
OE	Operational Environment
OES	Officer Education System
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OP	Observation Post
PIR	Priority Information Requirement
PME	Professional Military Education

R&S	Reconnaissance and Surveillance
ROE	Rules of Engagement
S2	Intelligence Staff Officer
S3	Operations Staff Officer
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SLC	Scout Leaders Course
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SNA	Social Network Assessment
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TLP	Troop Leading Procedure
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
USAWC	U.S. Army War College

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Knowledge dominance does scare us as Marines. General George Armstrong Custer probably thought he had knowledge dominance, too. Any time you think you're smarter than your adversary; you're probably about a half-mile from the Little Big Horn.

Colonel Art Corbett, USMC, 2004

Background

The war in Iraq presents the Army with an operating environment that is unfamiliar to a force that has trained for conventional warfare in open terrain. The urban environment presents challenges at the strategic, operational and tactical levels as the Army tries to understand these new concepts called asymmetric warfare and full spectrum operations. The challenges were evident as forces fought toward Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I) and continue to develop as our forces have struggled with the insurgency, the Shiite – Sunni civil war, and the training of Iraqi Security Forces.

The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for such critical tasks as patrolling streets, clearing buildings, and securing fixed sites have continued to evolve and improve. However, as a force, tactical units continue to struggle with the collection and dissemination of combat information and in turn intelligence. The commanders, especially at battalion level and below, need an efficient and effective intelligence system. The intelligence challenge has been apparent to U.S. Army leadership since the Army forces started operations in these urban environments during the stability operations in early May 2003 during OIF I. The purpose is to find a way to improve the

intelligence system currently in place and offer a method of improvement through improved organization and training.

The focus of the research will be on the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level. The research will look closely at the current personnel, assets, and capabilities within a combined arms battalion conducting combat operations in relation to the urban environment. The research will also review the level of training those personnel and organizations received prior to entering their current area of operations, and determine the planning tools and methodology the battalion uses to conduct operations in an urban environment.

The purpose of this research is to identify weaknesses in the current organization and training of the U.S. Army units supporting operations in Iraq presently and in the future. Is the Military Intelligence community utilizing all available intelligence systems, personnel and capabilities to support the ground commanders' intent? Is the combined arms battalion staff training focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning, information collection and dissemination, and intelligence development or analysis? Have the Army's Officer Education System (OES) and Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) caught up with the contemporary operational environment (COE) and adjusted their training to prepare the force to effectively operate in urban areas and against an insurgency? Lastly, does the Army have the right personnel assigned to these organizations to ensure the organizations success? Answering these difficult questions will be necessary before deciding if a change may be warranted or before making a recommendation about the organization and training of the combat arms battalions.

Primary Research Question

The contemporary operational environment (COE) creates learning opportunities on a daily basis for tactical units operating in urban environments throughout Iraq. The U.S. Army leadership at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations is learning these lessons. One of the temptations, when executing a counterinsurgency operation, is to modify certain collection methods that may actually be proven and tactically sound. Understandably, each commander that occupies a certain area of operation in Iraq and begins to conduct operations will want to use certain maneuvers, intelligence collections, and protection methods with which he is most familiar and comfortable. Information dominance becomes even more important in asymmetric warfare. I will research the current intelligence collection methods, systems, and organizations available to determine the strengths and weaknesses of each in trying to answer my primary research question. How can intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments be improved at the battalion level and below?

Secondary Research Questions

There are other questions that I will need to answer through research before the primary research question can be addressed accurately. What force capabilities would enhance intelligence collection in urban environments?

The Army's military intelligence community provides many skilled and essential personnel to support the tactical commanders' operations within the urban environments, but a joint approach may bring new methods and new successes to the fight. Intelligence collection in urban environments may require a new way to think about targeting, not in the lethal sense, but targeting specific to an intelligence-centric fight. I will research the

current targeting cell structure, capabilities, and purpose at the maneuver battalion level to determine if and how the targeting cell structure and function can be improved by the battalion commander to support the battalions decisive operation. Targets that have intelligence value could now be the dynamic targets that we seek in counterinsurgency operations.

One of the critical components to success in urban environments is the development of actionable intelligence. The purpose of the intelligence system is to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence information that is accurate and timely to provide the commander and his unit with a clear situational understanding that can be used to conduct successful operations. Actionable intelligence is achieved only when the tactical battalion commander employs the collection assets in the right mix, at the right place, and at the right time. These intelligence collection assets are not currently standardized at the battalion level for this specific task and purpose. Ad hoc tactical intelligence collection teams have been thrown together to try to provide the tactical battalion commander with an essential intelligence collection capability. The tactical battalion commander must have a permanent and standardized intelligence collection asset that he can employ to overcome the challenges of actionable intelligence in an urban environment.

Commanders need to be trained in the employment of the tactical intelligence collection teams in order to gain actionable intelligence. Training considerations are another key element in answering my primary research question. What intelligence collection training in the OES, NCOES, and unit commanders' pre-deployment plan need to be trained or improved for urban environments?

In the research, I will study the current training plans for forces preparing to deploy to Iraq at the brigade level and below. Training for the integration, tactical employment, and protection of the intelligence collection assets will be essential at all unit levels in a tactical battalion prior to its deployment into the theater of operations in Iraq. I will research the current training methodology for the leaders, staffs, and tactical executers of the battalions that will be operating in urban environments. I will examine the current training in the Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Educations Systems to determine if the current course work is developing the leaders that will positively affect the force with their knowledge gained on intelligence operations in urban operations against and insurgency. I will also consider the language and cultural training that can serve as combat multipliers during counterinsurgency operations. The cultural terrain on an asymmetric battlefield must be understood and exploited for mission success. The impact of culture on military operations in an urban environment must be considered and understood in this culture-centric warfare currently being executed in Iraq. The training and development of these cultural elements must be approached just as intensely as any tactical task before a unit's deployment to Iraq.

The assumption cannot be made that commanders at all levels understand how intelligence assets support the tactical fight. The tactical commanders must be trained, standard operating procedures (SOPs) developed, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) refined in order to derive maximum effectiveness from all tactical intelligence collection assets.

Assumptions

The research will be conducted with the assumption that the Army will continue to conduct operations in urban environments, based on the prediction that seventy-five percent of the world will live in urban areas within the next ten years. I also assume that the Army will fight another irregular war against an insurgency in the future and will need to develop and refine the skills necessary to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation. Further more, I assume that the Army will conduct urban operations with a joint or multinational partner; either situation could only complicate the problems and possible solutions of intelligence planning, management, and synchronization. Additionally, I assume that there will have to be changes made in the Army's leader development, professional military education, and training methodology. Lastly, it is assumed that there is going to be a demand that cannot be fulfilled by the U.S. military for Arabic speaking linguists to support the current tactical operations in Iraq.

Definitions of Key Terms

I will use the following key terms throughout the research:

1. Counterinsurgency - Those military, paramilitary, political, economical, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (FM 1-02, 1-47).
2. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) – A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human resources (FM 1-02, 1-95).
3. Insurgency - An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (FM 1-02, 1-101).
4. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) – An enabling operation that integrates and synchronizes all battlefield operating systems to collect and produce relevant information to facilitate the commander's decision making (FM

1-02, 1-102).

5. Operational Environment – A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander (FM 1-02, 1-138).
6. Urban Area – A topographical complex where manmade construction or high population density is the dominant feature. (FM 1-02, 1-196).
7. Urban Environment – includes the physical area and the complex and dynamic interaction among its key components of the terrain, the population, and the supporting infrastructure as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems (FM 1-02, 1-196).
8. Urban Operations – Offense, defense, stability, and support operations conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent terrain where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features (FM 1-02, 1-196).

Limitations

The only problem I anticipate is ensuring that all research information is current and relevant to the current urban operating environment. This will include the successes and challenges being experienced in Iraq, and the training plans developed and conducted before forces deploy to Iraq. Much of the information about the ongoing operations in Iraq has a classification that does not allow me to use it in this unclassified thesis.

Scope and Delimitations

The study will assess feasibility and suitability of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations of the U.S. Army in urban environments and against an insurgency. The focus of the research will be on identifying the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level in urban environments through improved organizations and training. The emphasis will be on the

human aspect of intelligence collection or Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The following related issues will not be described or assessed: (1) The study will not address other intelligence systems such as Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), or Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and (2) The study will not address the technological intelligence systems such as computers and the related computer software functions.

The significance of this study is to identify the most effective intelligence operations currently being conducted in urban operations against an insurgency, identify the common factors leading to that effectiveness, and make recommendations on how to improve the organizations and their training across the Army.

Summary

Urban operations are not new to the U.S. Army but are new to the majority of the Army's current leadership, especially at the tactical level. The individual and collective tactical tasks have been refined and trained for operations inside an urban area. However, the intelligence process has been slower to develop and provide the tactical commander with the essential intelligence information needed to conduct his operations effectively. It is hoped that this study will identify the key elements to executing successful intelligence operations in an urban environment and make recommendations about the types of assets and training that should be standardized at the battalion level and below. I will do this by comparing historic perspectives of intelligence operations in an urban environment against an insurgency to today's Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and making recommendations for the future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Accurate, timely intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of the insurgency is a prerequisite to success in all facets of counterinsurgency warfare. Due to the inherent precariousness of their situation, even counterinsurgent forces in possession of good intelligence can be defeated; but alternatively, they have no hope whatsoever without it.

COL David J. Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence*

Purpose

The overall purpose of this research is to identify weaknesses in the current organization and training of the U.S. Army units currently conducting operations in urban environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The literature review in this chapter will focus on identifying the shortcomings and solutions for the intelligence systems supporting operations at the tactical level in urban environments. The emphasis will be on the human aspect of intelligence collection or Human Intelligence (HUMINT). All of the literature reviewed for this research was available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or was available through the CARL online research databases that provide controlled access to numerous professional journals and professional writings.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) was helpful in providing current professional writings but the After Action Reviews (AARs) from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were not available for use in the research due to the classification of those documents. Although the literature review could not include these current sources,

the research has sufficient breadth and depth to encompass relevant thoughts and opinions on how to improve the intelligence process in urban environments.

Current Doctrine

The Army leadership understood after the operational experiences in Kosovo and Bosnia that the 21st century force needed to be capable of conducting full spectrum operations, that intelligence was going to play a critical part in that forces success, and that the Army of the 21st century was going to run on information.

Intelligence superiority, we are constantly told, is the key to success in war, particularly the war against terrorism. It is indisputably the case that to make war without the guidance intelligence can give is to strike in the dark, to blunder about, launching blows that do not connect with the target or missed the target altogether. All that is true; without intelligence, armies and navies, as was so often the case in the age before electricity, will simply not find each other, at least not in the short term. When and if they do, the better-informed force will probably fight on a more advantageous term. Yet, having admitted the significance of the pre-vision intelligence provides, it still has to be recognized that opposed enemies, if they really seek battle, will succeed in finding each other and that, when they do, intelligence factors will rarely determine the outcome. Intelligence may be usually necessary but is not a sufficient condition of victory. (Keegan, 334)

The doctrinal sources used in the research were sufficient for the scope of discussion in this literature review and include:

- Army Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, September 2004.
- Army Field Manual 2-0, *Intelligence*, May 2004.
- Army Field Manual 2-01, *Intelligence Synchronization*, November 2002.
- Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008.
- Army Field Manual 3-06, *Urban Operations*, October 2006.
- Army Field Manual 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, February 2002.

- Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006.
- Army Field Manual 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, April 2008.
- Army Field Manual 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Training*, March 1994.
- Army Field Manual 34-2-1, *Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence to Support to Counterreconnaissance*, June 1991.

The FM 3-0, *Operations*, dated February 2008, is the capstone doctrine for the U.S. Army for the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and for future prolonged conflicts as an expeditionary force. Additional emerging intelligence doctrine like FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*, October 2007, is available but discussed in concept only due to its current For Operational Use Only (FOUO) classification.

Historical Perspective

The reader need understand the complexities of urban environments and their military significance before going any further. In his book “The Art of War,” Sun Tzu writes, “knowledge is power, and the result of a lack of knowledge will certainly be defeat.” The statement was true in 400 BC and remains true today after some two-thousand years, especially in urban environments.

Roger J. Spiller presents urban warfare critical points by describing the operations in Hue, Vietnam in 1968, in his article “Urban Warfare: Its History and Its Future.” Spiller states, “that the very human composition of the city could pose yet another set of difficulties. A city full of terrified civilians or a city swollen with equally terrified refugees could produce a corps’ worth of friction without ever firing a shot” (Spiller,

440). The urban environment, considered in military terms, is a unique environment, both in terms of its essential character and its behavior. Faced with the complexities of this environment, military analysts have resorted to explaining cities as a “system of systems.” Spiller describes the relationship between a military force and a city as dynamic, and because of this dynamic quality, the urban environment works as an important “third force,” uniquely influencing the behavior of all sides engaged. “The differences in operations on open terrain versus an urban environment are so great that the commander might think he has passed from one theater of operations to another” (Spiller 446). Spiller describes the battle for Hue as a “think as you go crisis response” with always the least acceptable and most expensive course of action taken. He compares an attack across a street in Hue as characteristic of a river crossing somewhere else. “While the mission tempo would subside, the tactical tempo would intensify. Smaller acts would mean more. Tactical forces would combat smaller targets more fiercely. Buildings would become campaigns, stairs would become avenues of approach, and rooms would become fortresses” (Spiller, 447).

James H. Willbanks describes how intelligence failures by the allied forces affected the tactical operations in Hue in his articles “The Battle of Hue, 1968.” The attack on Hue was part of the Tet Offensive on 31 January 1968. Hue was the longest and bloodiest battle of the Tet Offensive. Eighty-four thousand North Vietnamese and VC troops conducted simultaneous attacks on thirty-six of the forty-four provincial capitals, five of the six autonomous cities to include Saigon and Hue, sixty-four of the two-hundred forty-two district capitals, and fifty hamlets. The intelligence assets were overwhelmed with receiving and disseminating information due to the number of attacks

over such a wide area of Vietnam and the tactical commanders were under great stress to regain control of the cities that were attacked during the Tet Offensive. “The task force commander, having received no reliable intelligence to the contrary, believed that only a small enemy force had penetrated Hue as part of a local diversionary attack; little did he know that almost a full enemy division had seized the city” (Willbanks, 133).

There was initially a force of ten battalions totaling eight-thousand strong opposing the allied forces in the Hue region but that force would grow to twenty battalions by the end of the battle for Hue on 2 March 1968. Brigadier General Oscar C. “Frosty” LaHue, the assistant commander of the First Marine Division and commander of Task Force X-Ray, later said “Early intelligence did not reveal the quantity of enemy involved that we subsequently found were committed to Hue.” (Willbanks, 136). The decision to initially deploy only a Marine company size force to deal with the situation was made with very limited information. Additionally, the Marine Company that was committed to Hue had no idea what to expect once they had reached the city. The intelligence system had initially failed to anticipate the imminent attack on Hue and would later fail to warn the tactical commanders when indications of an attack became available. The lack of enemy intelligence in Hue would drive a series of poor tactical decisions that would piecemeal units into the city, a tactic that caused 1585 U.S. Marine and Army casualties; 221 dead and 1364 wounded. The historic perspective of the urban environment complexities and their military significance in past operations conducted by the U.S. Army are relevant to understanding the shortcomings of current operations.

Current Literature

There is much discussion among the maneuver and intelligence communities on how to improve the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments. The John F. Kimmons article, “Transforming Army Intelligence,” that appeared in the *Military Review* in December 2006, discusses many ideas and recommendations that have surfaced ranging from an increased number of intelligence personnel and assets available to the tactical commander, to improved equipment and networks to process and share the intelligence, to improved training at all levels about the collection, analysis, and use of actionable intelligence. “Army intelligence is transforming its organization, training, and techniques to provide fused, all-source, “actionable” intelligence along tactically useful timelines to soldiers and commanders” (Kimmons, 69). The following statement by Kimmons describes the impact of HUMINT on the current urban operations being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan and how seriously the Army is addressing these current shortcomings to aid the tactical commanders.

By 2013, the Army will add over 7,000 Military Intelligence soldiers to its ranks. More than 90 percent of that growth will be aligned with enhanced tactical collection and analysis. Army HUMINT capacity will increase more than any other intelligence discipline and will more than double in strength (Kimmons, 70).

Ralph Peters article, “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” which appeared in *Parameters* in the spring of 2000, describes the classification of cities as hierarchical, multicultural, or tribal for military purposes (Peters, 4). “Militarily, hierarchical cities, with their united citizenries, can provide bitter, prolonged resistance to an attacker. Paradoxically, they can be the easiest to govern once occupied -- if the population recognizes its interest lie in collaboration” (Peters, 5). Tribal cities pose the greatest

threat and create the greatest difficulties to military operations. Obviously, the increasing size and number of cities pose practical challenges for urban operations. “Even in the smoothest operation, cities consume troops; in combat, they devour armies” (Peters, 12). Intelligence elements have a difficult time understanding and describing the tribal and clan cultures, traditions, depth of their hatred for one another, and the reasons they fight. “In an age of urban operations, with many more to come, we must think more deeply and clearly about this environment than we have done” (Peters, 12).

Robert Wagner and Stephen P. Perkins’ article, “Joint Intelligence Transformation – Bridging the Gap,” which appeared in *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* in September 2004, addresses the need for Joint Operational Intelligence Initiatives that include Joint Intelligence Training and Education and Joint Intelligence Concept Development and Experimentation. “Traditional intelligence missions are joined by the challenge of ever increasing nontraditional intelligence roles” (Wagner, 8). These concepts support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) through joint operational transformation and as a global joint force provider.

Paul A. Shelton’s article, “Leveraging Actionable Intelligence,” which appeared in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in December 2005, expresses a comparable concern about the lack of institutional focus “on training and resourcing tactical commanders at the battalion level and below to conduct intelligence operations is an inherent part of combat leadership.” Shelton's observations are that leaders at all levels need to be trained to conduct information analysis gathered from the lowest tactical levels without a reliance on their higher headquarters. “Small units are not currently staffed to support continuous

aggressive intelligence operations. Battalions/Squadrons should be staffed to support 24/7 intelligence operations” (Shelton, 17).

COL Ralph O. Baker’s article, “HUMINT-CENTRIC OPERATIONS: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment,” published in *Military Review* in April 2007, describes the first-hand experience of a Brigade Commander during urban operations in Baghdad, Iraq. “We neither understood nor anticipated the inadequacy of our conventionally designed intelligence collection and analysis system” (Baker, 13). COL Baker grouped the challenges of transitioning his BCT's conventional intelligence system into a HUMINT-centric system into three categories: leadership, organization, and training. COL Baker’s article not only acknowledged the inadequacies of the conventionally designed intelligence collection and analysis system, but also validated that a HUMINT-based intelligence program could be effective with the proper organizational structure, training, and leader involvement.

The Jack D. Kem article, “Urban Operations: Defining the Environment,” which appeared in the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* in June 2005, notes a list of characteristics identified in a 2000 RAND study common to urban environments that include:

- High number of noncombatants
- High amount of valuable infrastructure
- Presence of multidimensional battlespace
- Restrictive rules of engagement (ROE)
- Short detection, observation, and engagement ranges
- Many avenues of approach
- Low freedom of movement and maneuver for mechanized forces

- Degraded communications functionality
- High logistical requirements.

Kem also refers to the RAND study when he describes that the three components of the "urban triad" that creates a "dynamic system-of systems" that is composed of complex terrain, population, and infrastructure. Urban operations create unique challenges to military operations that include: reduced advantages from technological superiority; ground operations are manpower intensive, time-consuming, restrictive and decentralized; and provide a tactical advantage to the insurgents. Throughout history, geographical characteristics are not the only characteristics that complicate urban operations. Human aspects are equal in effect and consideration.

Educational Research Perspective

The historic perspective of the urban environment complexities and their military significance must be understood when determining how military intelligence plays such an important role in successful operations in such a complex terrain. Recent theses and monographs written by officers at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) bring out some interesting points that are very relevant to this research. The information and analysis from these research projects of professional military officers were the most relevant and helpful tools in my research.

COL David J. Clark, U.S. Army, wrote a research paper at the USAWC in 2006 entitled "The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations." COL Clark does an outstanding job identifying and describing the importance of good intelligence in

counterinsurgency operations with his historic accounts of French-Indochina, Algeria, Malaya, and finally in the current campaign in Iraq. The similar themes throughout each of these counterinsurgency operations are the need for HUMINT, the integration of indigenous forces, and the manpower intensiveness of counterinsurgency operations. “As successful counterinsurgency campaigns suggest, a universal principle emerges -- a joint police and intelligence organization, focused on the exploitation of human intelligence data, is essential to victory” (Clark, 15). COL Clark’s research is important in looking at the lessons of the past and creating solutions for the future.

MAJ Bichson Bush, U.S. Army, wrote a monograph at SAMS in 2001 entitled “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Support to Urban Operations.” MAJ Bush discusses the importance of pre-operational and robust ISR planning and all-source integration. “The right technical ISR overmatch in an urban area can complement and augment the HUMINT efforts, especially when the urban environment poses difficult and dangerous challenges for HUMINT operations. Redundant all-source ISR operations are essential for mission accomplishment and reduce the likelihood of being deceived or tricked by the adversaries” (Bush, 11). MAJ Bush also describes how the multi-dimensional urban terrain has a human intensive aspect and how that human aspect has the ability to negate a technological advantage during urban operations.

MAJ Peter S. Im, U.S. Army, wrote a monograph at SAMS in 2005 entitled “Expanding the Approach to Urban IPB.” MAJ Im suggests re-examining our intelligence doctrine, especially HUMINT doctrine, in order to better support urban operations. “Assessments from current operations point to a need to emphasize the social domain aspects of urban intelligence. HUMINT is cited as the most critical discipline in

shortage for these operations” (Im, 15). MAJ Im also describes that the reluctance to identify and use the lessons learned from the shortcomings of the intelligence operations in urban terrain during past operations has forced the joint intelligence community to identify the viable solutions quickly in supporting tactical commanders.

MAJ Todd C. Hogan, U.S. Air Force, wrote a research paper at CGSG in 2007 entitled “The Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Dilemma: Can the Department of Defense Achieve Information Superiority?” MAJ Hogan brings up an interesting point about persistent ISR. “The need for persistence implies a need to detect, identify, and characterize change in a targets status anywhere, anytime, in any weather with increasingly higher levels of fidelity” (Hogan, 3). MAJ Hogan discusses the integration of joint assets to provide this continuous observation, tracking, and targeting. His approach is a more systems-based approach utilizing all available joint assets, including the non-traditional ISR assets, to provide a capability to combatant commanders in support of their operations.

Conclusion

The literature review in this chapter explains the intelligence challenges that maneuver commanders face in the urban environments during urban operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operational challenges are not going away. However, these challenges may be mitigated with improved intelligence organizations and training. The Military Intelligence community leadership has identified shortcomings in the 1990s era structure and function of its assets and developed a plan to restructure the intelligence capabilities at the brigade level. This restructure is designed to allow tactical commanders at the brigade level and below to conduct effective intelligence processes with little or no

assistance from their higher headquarters. The research methodologies in Chapter 3 further define the research questions and discuss the analytical data used.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Given the environment our forces are operating in today and will continue to confront in the future, HUMINT-centric operations and IO are no longer merely “enablers” or supporting efforts. Quite simply, they are the decisive components of our strategy.

COL Ralph O. Baker, *HUMINT-CENTRIC OPERATIONS*

This chapter identified the analysis necessary to formulate the conclusions and recommendations about the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion level of organization and operation. The research focused on three subject areas: (1) The organic intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion conducting operations in an urban environment. (2) The training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and leadership on the employment of ISR assets in an urban environment and on the overall intelligence process. (3) The validity and applicability of current U.S. Army doctrinal literature about the urban environment, urban operations conducted by a maneuver battalion, and how ISR supports those urban operations.

The research approach used for this thesis was a qualitative approach. The analysis assessed the quality of the maneuver officers training, the quality of the doctrinal sources available, and the quality of the ISR assets in a maneuver battalion. The research analyzed the relationship of doctrinal ISR organizations and capabilities within a modular maneuver battalion compared to the actuality of those ISR assets in the maneuver battalions operating in urban environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research method focused on content analysis from primary and secondary source materials of previously

published literature pertinent to answering the research questions. The source materials focused on the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but additionally utilized a historic perspective from past urban operations conducted by the U.S. Army for lessons learned.

Assets and Capabilities

The first part of the research examined the ISR assets and capabilities in three areas that included:

1. The ISR assets organic to a maneuver battalion, to include the reconnaissance squadron, in a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) and an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is a legacy force structure with enhanced ISR assets and capabilities and will not be discussed as part of the analysis.
2. The ad hoc intelligence organizations that maneuver battalion commanders are assembling for urban operations with in Iraq.
3. The Army plan to increase the number of ISR personnel in modular units to increase the capabilities available to maneuver battalion commanders.

The examination of these three subject areas established a basis for evaluating which ISR assets and capabilities would provide the best support to a maneuver battalion commander conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in an urban environment. The research compared doctrinal ISR assets from the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for a modular maneuver battalion with the actual ISR assets a maneuver battalion is deploying with to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Training

The second part of the analysis studied the training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and leadership on the employment of ISR assets and on the overall intelligence process in an urban environment. The analysis focused on two of the three core domains of leader development for maneuver officers and included: (1) Institutional training: Basic Officers Leaders Course III (BOLC III) and Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), and (2) Operational training: Specific training during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle before deployment, and job experience.

Maneuver officers assume that the intelligence personnel, both officers and enlisted, are proficient in their military occupational specialty (MOS) and fully capable of conducting their intelligence tasks. The basis in analyzing the training aspect of this research focused on the maneuver officers' abilities to employ the ISR assets effectively based on an understanding of their capabilities and limitations in an urban environment. The object of additional analysis included the level of training a maneuver officer received on the complexities of the urban environment and the planning and execution of urban operations for a maneuver battalion.

Doctrine

The final part of the analysis examined the U.S. Army doctrine available to guide, train, and assist maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and leadership with the employment of ISR assets in an urban environment. The research examined the doctrinal literature in the form of U.S. Army Field Manuals to determine their validity and applicability about the urban environment, urban operations conducted by a maneuver

battalion, and how ISR supports those urban operations. The basis for the analyzed doctrinal literature focused on three areas that included:

1. Intelligence Disciplines: The capabilities and limitations of the intelligence warfighting function and intelligence disciplines in an urban environment.
2. ISR Operations: The conduct of ISR operations and tasks supporting a maneuver commander during urban operations.
3. Urban specific information: Described the urban environment, defined urban operations, and how to employ ISR assets effectively in urban operations.

There was a sufficient review of U.S. Army doctrinal literature for the purpose of this research but limited by the handling classification of emerging intelligence doctrine like FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*, October 2007, and FM 2-91.4, *Intelligence Support to Urban Operations*, March 2008. The research analyzed the emerging U.S. Army intelligence doctrine for its theoretical approach on intelligence organizations and operations supporting maneuver battalions in urban operations and appropriate recommendations made about further research on the subject.

Conclusion

The research methodology attempted to assess the ISR assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion, the training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and leadership on the employment of ISR assets, and the availability and value of doctrinal literature about the employment of ISR assets in and urban environment and urban operations. The assessment assisted with the development of the evidence necessary to formulate the conclusions and recommendations about the intelligence

collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion level of organization and operation. The research method and sources used in this thesis are valid based on the focus on urban operations and current operations conducted by maneuver battalions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The research utilized current U.S. Army doctrine and other literary sources that were effective in promoting profound thought and analysis that provided a logical conclusion to the research question. The final analysis conducted during the development of this thesis is expected to show that the intelligence shortcomings in urban operations may be tied more to the lack of military intelligence assets and personnel available than to the training or doctrinal shortcomings.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Information dominance is critical in warfare, especially urban warfare where the population is a dominant feature. The research analyzed the intelligence organizations, training, and doctrine available to maneuver battalions in order to obtain that information dominance. The purpose of this research is to identify shortcomings in the intelligence organizations, training, and doctrine and to recommend solutions to alleviate the identified shortcomings. The result would be a better-prepared maneuver battalion organized and trained with the appropriate doctrine to fight and win the urban battles.

The first research question addresses the organization of the organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and inherent capabilities within the maneuver battalion and the reconnaissance squadron conducting urban operations. The second research question addressed the quality and type of training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and unit leaders on the employment of ISR assets during urban operations and the overall intelligence process. The third research question addressed the quality, availability, and clarity of the existing U.S. Army doctrine available to educate the maneuver battalion leaders about the urban environment, urban operations, and how ISR supports those urban operations.

The analysis of the answers to these questions identified the recommendations addressed in Chapter 5 about the ISR assets, training, and doctrine at the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron level.

Assets and Capabilities

The contemporary operational environment (COE) in Iraq has changed the way tactical levels of command operate. The tempo of the operations, the size of the area of responsibility (AOR), and the complex, human-centric urban terrain have changed the capability requirements for the tactical commands of the BCT and below. The BCT is operating as more of an operational command than a tactical command. The BCT must coordinate, manage, and employ forces with U.S. interagency partners, NGOs, IGOs, host-nation governmental and military assets, and multinational forces. These tasks were traditionally conducted at the division level, but in the COE, each level of command is routinely operating at one level above its modular design. The tempo and battle rhythm of tactical units have changed from the plan, prepare, and execute cycle of major combat operations to a 24-hour continuous operations tempo during stability operations. The tempo demands a redundancy in capabilities for the staff, C2, intelligence, and maneuver capabilities to meet the increased requirements driven by this tempo. The size of the commands AOR also drives the increased requirements. The BCT AOR is the size of a traditional division AOR. The AORs in Iraq are divided under a regional command where the BCT's are operating as an operational level command. Examples include Multi-National Division (MND) North, MND-West, and MND-Central.

The HBCT and IBCT Maneuver Battalions and Reconnaissance Squadrons have assumed the role as the largest tactical command element operating in Iraq. The intelligence capability requirements for the tactical commands have increased because of the tempo of the operations, the size of the area of responsibility (AOR), and the complex, human-centric urban terrain comparable to the BCT. The maneuver battalions

and reconnaissance squadrons are conducting operations on a continuous 24-hour battle rhythm. The increased requirements have the greatest effect on the intelligence staff section and on the need for additional HUMINT assets at the battalion level to manage the collection and analysis of the human-centric urban environment.

The amount of Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) greatly increases during urban operations due to considerations and effects of the population. Because most CCIR in an urban environment are based on human considerations, the HCT is the optimal intelligence collection asset for the battalion commander. The ability of the HCT to conduct human source operations, conduct tactical questioning, interrogate detainees, and conduct open source exploitation provides the battalion commander a specialized collection resource to answer the CCIR. Some examples of CCIR for an urban environment include:

- Who are the key town council, tribal, religious leaders in the AO?
- What are the perceptions of these key community leaders?
- Who are the hostile personnel in the AO?
- Who or what are the key information providers in the AO?
- What effort is the enemy making to influence the target audiences?
- What tools are they using (radio, TV, leaflets, disinformation, intimidation)?
- Who are the supporters and what are their actions? (FM 3-90.5, B-2)

The maneuver battalions conducting urban operations in Iraq have no organic intelligence specific HUMINT capabilities. FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defines Human Intelligence (HUMINT) as a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human resources (2004, 1-95). The reference to

HUMINT assets in this chapter is to the dedicated HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) with four soldiers in the MOS of 35M, HUMINT Collector. The Operational Management Team (OMT) is a four-man HCT management asset that integrates into the supporting battalion S2 section to provide oversight and technical support for the HCT's.

The assertion is that the lack of the organic OMT and HCT assets at the battalion level degrades the effectiveness of the intelligence collection for the HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons during urban operations and consequently degrades the effectiveness of the tactical operations. The assertion is based on personal experience from conducting urban operations in Iraq as a Ground Cavalry Troop Commander, and from the articles written by former Battalion Operations Officers (S3) and Battalion Intelligence Officers (S2) that discuss the need to improve and restructure intelligence assets at the maneuver battalion level.

HUMINT Collection Team

FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, defines a HUMINT collector as a person who is specifically trained and certified for, tasked with, and engages in the collection of intelligence from individuals (HUMINT sources) for the purpose of answering intelligence information requirements (2006, 1-4). The HUMINT Collection Team (HCTs) is a four-person team consisting of two Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) and two junior enlisted personnel in the MOS of 35M, HUMINT Collector. FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, defines the specific role, target, intent, and functions of an HCT listed below in Table 1.

Table 1. The Role, Target, Intent, and Functions of an HCT	
ROLE	Determine Enemy/Threat: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capabilities - Order of Battle - Vulnerabilities - Intentions
TARGET	Adversary Decision-making Architecture
INTENT	Shape Friendly visualization of Enemy/Threat
FUNCTIONS	HUNINT Collection Activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tactical Questioning - Screening of sources - Interrogation of detainees - Debriefing of patrols - Human Source Operations - DOCEX (Document Exploitation) Analysis of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Link Diagrams - Patterns

HCT's collect human source information from the specialized HUMINT collection requirements that include but are not limited to –

- Conducting source operations. This includes finding and exploiting human sources for information. Operations with formal contacts are only conducted by HUMINT specifically trained and authorized collectors. The process of registering and tasking informants is a specific HUMINT function.
- Debriefing US and allied forces, civilian personnel including refugees, displaced persons (DPs), third-country nationals, and local inhabitants. Patrols are debriefed for potential sources and pattern analysis development.

- Interrogating enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and other detainees. The HCT may not be granted direct access but may be allowed to sit in during questioning, provide questions, or at a minimum receive the reports from the local authorities.
- Initial exploitation of open-source documents, media, and materiel for information of intelligence interest.

The HCT's employment into an AOR is based largely on the security situation. The HCT operates best in a permissive environment where they are able to move among the population as a four-man dismounted team in clothing that allows them to blend in with the population. The current security situation in Iraq does not allow this freedom of maneuver option for the HCT. The HCT's are often employed with a security element provided by the supporting battalion to conduct independent source operations. The HCT's are also employed as part of a tactical formation during missions conducted by a battalion maneuver element. The operations include mounted and dismounted patrols, cordon and search, and response to an emergency as part of the tactical reserve. The HCT's are employed with the tactical formations that are most likely to have contact with potential human sources such as detainees and witnesses after an operation. The targeting process drives the employment of the HCT's by determining the appropriate target based on operational requirements and capabilities. Targeting is a coordinated staff process that identifies operational and tactical priorities and commits the appropriate resource against that target. During urban operations, the targeting process focus is largely on information operations and intelligence collection to shape the operational environment. The OMT is

directly involved in the targeting process to provide the commander and staff with the capabilities, limitations, and deployment considerations for the HCT's.

“No mechanical collection device will ever match the observation and reasoning power of a trained Soldier: with a unique ability to recognize and report useful information gained from close assess into otherwise denied areas, he is the ultimate sensor” (Kimmons, 71). Kimmons made this comment in reference to the Army's Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative discussed in FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*. The manual is FOUO but provides training on the fundamentals of human information collection at the tactical level by non-MI soldiers. The ES2 initiative does not attempt to replace the specific functions of an HCT, but rather to train all soldiers in contact with the population on human information collection through normal contact. ES2 trains the soldier on recognizing human information collection opportunities, tactical questioning within their legal limits, and how to identify and hand-over potential sources to the HCT.

The HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron ISR assets can be trained to perform tactical questioning and provide information about the populations' attitudes and activities, but not the specialized collection requirements of the HCT as discussed below.

Military Source Operations (MSO) refer to the collection of foreign military and military-related intelligence by humans from humans; . . . Within the Army, MSO are conducted by trained personnel under the direction of military commanders. These specially trained personnel may employ the entire range of HUMINT collection operations. MSO sources include one-time, continuous, and formal contacts, from contact operations; and sources from interrogations, debriefings, and liaison activities (FM 2-22.3, 5-1).

There are specific legal considerations for these specific functions and unique capabilities conducted by an HCT. The majority of information collected by an HCT is through debriefing individuals who have first-hand knowledge about the information they are reporting. Additionally, the HCT can obtain information from the exploitation of open-source materials focused on the local media. This information and analysis produces the intelligence that commanders need to plan and conduct specific operations against the insurgency in an urban environment.

Since tactical information and intelligence collection occurred almost exclusively at the TF level, it makes sense that the THT work for the TF commander; . . . the THT is available to develop intelligence whenever the opportunities arises from walk-ins, after enemy engagements, or during actions on the objective. If the team is embedded in the TF, its security is inherent and it will have the opportunity to circulate throughout the battle during normal TF operations as well as to participate in planned operations and questioning of detainees; . . . all of this information is being lost on a daily basis because of lack of training and assets at battalion level. (Benson, 13)

The THT discussed by Benson is a Tactical HUMINT Team. It is a legacy force intelligence asset that served the same purpose as an HCT but it also included a counterintelligence capability. All operations have an intelligence component and require an effective intelligence capability to be successful. Effective intelligence drives effective operations. HUMINT provides the basic information necessary to employ other ISR assets effectively. A battalion-focused COIN strategy offers an intelligence collection benefit.

Other than the tactical Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a scout platoon, the maneuver battalion does not own dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Experience from Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that human intelligence (HUMINT) is by far the most valuable intelligence source

for commanders engaged in COIN warfare; . . . Tactical HUMINT collection would benefit from a closer relationship between THTs and maneuver units. THTs are in short supply and on their own can be ineffective, because the information they gather loses value unless it is acted on quickly by the maneuver unit owning the ground. (Ollivant, 162)

The lack of specialized organic HUMINT assets at the maneuver battalion and below degrades the intelligence capability and social network analysis (SNA) critical to successfully defeating an insurgency in an urban environment. The HCT provides the maneuver commander with a unique HUMINT capability tied to a collection and analysis process at the BCT level and higher. This allows the sources to be validated, exploited, and passed to a higher and even more specialized collection asset that can take full operational advantage of the source and the information provided.

Operational Management Team

FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, describes an Operational Management Team (OMT) as a four-man team consisting of a Warrant Officer (351M, HUMINT Collector Technician), two Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), and a junior enlisted soldier in the MOS of 35M, HUMINT Collector (2004, 6-13). The OMT integrates with the supported battalion S2 and the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) in the BCT MICO to furnish current threat information and answer the supported commander's information requirement (IRs). Each OMT can control up to four HCT's. FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, lists the OMT tasks as:

- Provide guidance and technical control of the operational HCTs
- Provide the collection and operational focus for HCTs
- Provide quality control and dissemination of reports for the HCTs

- Conduct single-discipline HUMINT analysis, and assist in mission analysis for the supported commander
- Educate the supported commander on the capabilities of the HCTs
- Integrate the HCTs directly into the maneuver commander's ISR planning (2004, 6-13)

Maneuver Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron ISR

The HBCT Combined Arms Battalions (CAB) and IBCT Rifle Battalions have organic ISR assets designed to collect information, and translate that information into intelligence to enhance the commanders understanding of the battlefield and make timely decisions. These assets are the battalion scout platoon, four Raven tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), and an eight-man Intelligence section. FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defines Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) as an enabling operation that integrates and synchronizes all battlefield operating systems to collect and produce relevant information to facilitate the commander's decision-making (2004, 1-102). The ISR operations produce intelligence on the enemy, environment, and civil considerations that the commander needs to make critical decisions. The ISR assets conduct operations primarily to answer the Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and facilitate the targeting process by filling the information gaps. The timeliness and accuracy of the intelligence depends on aggressive and continuous ISR operations.

The organic ISR assets of a maneuver battalion in an HBCT and IBCT have two distinct elements: the military intelligence personnel and assets, and the reconnaissance and security (R&S) assets. The divisions of labor between these assets are the functions

of collectors and analyzers. The military intelligence personnel are specific to the battalion staff and focus on ISR planning, information analysis, and intelligence dissemination. The R&S assets focus on information collection and providing security to the battalion. The integration and organic relationship between these two elements greatly enhances the ISR capability for the maneuver battalion. The HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons have an organic Intelligence Section (S2 Section) of eight military intelligence (MI) personnel as part of the battalion staff by MTOE. A Senior Intelligence Officer (S2), Tactical Intelligence Officer (Assistant S2), Senior Intelligence Sergeant, Intelligence Sergeant, and four Intelligence Analysts. The current HBCT and IBCT Maneuver Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron Intelligence Staff structure is shown below in Table 2.

Table 2. Current HBCT and IBCT Maneuver Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron Intelligence Staff Structure		
<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Title</u>
1 x 35D	O-3	S2
1 x 35D	O-2	Assistant S2
1 x 35F (96B)	E-6	Senior Intelligence Sergeant
1 x 35F (96B)	E-5	Intelligence Analyst Sergeant
2 x 35F (96B)	E-4	Intelligence Analyst
2 x 35F (96B)	E-3	Intelligence Analyst
TOTAL		2/0/6 = 8

The S2 is the coordinating staff officer for all intelligence matters that include intelligence readiness, intelligence tasks, intelligence synchronization, and other intelligence support. The S2 duties include:

- Managing the intelligence process
- Synchronizing intelligence support with combat and ISR operations
- Intelligence support to the targeting process through the development of a high-value target list (HVTL) and high-payoff target list (HPTL)
- ISR integration
- Supervising collection operations
- Information management for the situational development of the common operating picture (COP)
- Coordinating technical oversight and support for military intelligence assets (FM 3-90.6, 2-14).

The S2 section must perform all of these supporting intelligence tasks to support full-spectrum combat operations. The Benson and Nowlan article, “Tactical Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Battalion Intelligence to Win,” which appeared in *Military Intelligence* in December 2004, addresses the challenges they faced as staff officers for Task Force 1-68 Armor, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. MAJ Benson served as the Battalion S3 during the deployment to Iraq and CPT Nowlan served as the Battalion S2 while conducting combat operations north of Baghdad, Iraq during OIF I. TF 1-68 Armor conducted operations in an 800 square kilometer AOR with an estimated population of 150,000. The AOR was rural in nature with small towns throughout. The primary tactical missions of TF 1-68 Armor included raids, cordon and searches, route

security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted and dismounted ambushes. The S2 section was over-tasked far beyond its capabilities and resources.

Benson and Nowlan wrote, “To fully maximize the exploitation of intelligence and to make the troop-to-tasks ratio more manageable, the battalion S2 section needs to have intelligence capabilities similar to those of the brigade and division” (Benson, 14).

The battalion S2 section was required to be more detailed and responsive than the brigade S2 and division G2 because of the dynamics and enemy situation in Iraq and the fact that battalion (and below) conducted offensive operations almost daily. It was rare for a brigade or larger size unit to conduct offensive operations. As opposed to conventional top-down intelligence development, the majority of intelligence for the TF operations was originated, developed, and refined at the battalion level. (Benson, 9)

Benson and Nowlan recommend a battalion level staff structure change offered in the chart in Figure 1 below. The current eight-man S2 section is not sufficient to support 24-hour continuous operations at the battalion level. The addition of one S2X, 35E - HUMINT and CI Intelligence Officer, and an additional 35M, HUMINT Collector is a sound recommendation from Benson. It would provide an increased organic capability for HUMINT operations at the maneuver battalion level. The maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron HUMINT capabilities would still be limited without the addition of an OMT to the battalion S2 section and three HCT's under battalion control to provide a 24-hour HUMINT capability to support the urban operations.

Duty Title	Rank	MOS	Duty Description	# Personnel Required
S2	CPT	35D	Primary intelligence officer	1
NCOIC	MSG	19Z50	NCOIC	1
S2X	1LT	35D	Manages HUMINT database	2 (day and night shifts)
BICC	2LT	35D	Assistant S2	2 (day and night shifts)
HUMINT Collector	Enlisted	97E	BN HUMINT collector	2 (day and night shifts)
Translator	Enlisted/Civilian	09L/Civ	Translator aide	2 (day and night shifts)
CI Team	SSG/SFC	97B30/40	Conduct CI operations	2 (day and night shifts)
Senior Analyst	SSG/SFC	96B30/40	Senior enlisted analyst	1
Analyst	SPC	96B10	Assistant to senior analyst	2 (day and night shifts)
Analyst	SPC	96B10	Database manager	2 (day and night shifts)
Total				17

Figure 1. Recommended TOE Changes to a Battalion S2 Section

Source: Benson, *Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq: Restructuring Battalion Intelligence to Win*. (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 30, no.4, October-December 2004), 14.

Counterinsurgency (COIN), especially in an urban environment, is an intelligence-driven operation that is very human intensive and requires a greater number of personnel to conduct effective operations. The insurgent center of gravity (COG) is the population. The success of the insurgency is dependent upon how well the population protects, resources, and supports the insurgents. Ollivants' article, "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations," which appeared in *Military*

Review in August 2006, addresses the lessons he learned while serving as the Battalion S3 of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. 1-5 CAV conducted combat operations in Baghdad, Najaf, Fallujah, and North Babil, Iraq. These are large urban centers where 1-5 CAV conducted raids, cordon and searches, route security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted and dismounted patrols during combat operations in Iraq. Ollivant discussed the maneuver battalion as the premier organization that COIN doctrine should be built around for conducting urban operations.

At the local level, only the maneuver battalion can execute across the full spectrum of COIN tasks; . . . the maneuver battalion alone is capable of providing sustained security operations within a given community; . . . integration with the community creates obvious benefits for intelligence collection, information operations, and community outreach. (Ollivant, 162)

There is a greater need to identify the enemy elements as a criminal element, a local militia, or a dedicated insurgency element and targeted effectively. The decisions to discredit, co-opt, or remove a specific element in the insurgency have a tactical, operational, and strategic implication. The HCT's are instrumental in providing the ethnic, religious, political, and cultural demographics of the society by establishing relationships and social networks through informants.

According to my research and personal experience from conducting urban operations in Iraq as a Ground Cavalry Troop Commander, and from the articles written by the former Battalion S3s and Battalion S2s with experience in Iraq, the CAB, Infantry Battalion, and Reconnaissance Squadron S2 sections need to add one four-man OMT to plan, coordinate, and control the HCT activities in the battalion. The addition of this OMT would enhance the capabilities of the maneuver battalion S2 section by having a

dedicated HCT management system to coordinate with the BCT intelligence assets for increased capabilities and effectiveness.

The addition of one OMT and three HCT's to each maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron would allow the maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons to operate independently in a BCT's area of responsibility (AOR) and allow the BCT intelligence assets to fill the intelligence gaps identified by the maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons. This organic HUMINT section in the BCT's MICO is designed with one OMT and three HCT's. This design allows the OMT to remain at the BCT level for the planning, coordination, and technical support of the HCT's and provides the ability to task-organize one HCT to each of the BCT's three battalion size maneuver elements. The HUMINT section of the BCT MICO provides the four elements of staff support, analysis, C2, and collection necessary to provide the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron commanders with effective HUMINT support during urban operations.

The addition of this HUMINT section composed of an OMT and three HCT's that currently exists in the HBCT and IBCT Military Intelligence Company (MICO), would require no personnel or equipment change for it to be a duplicated intelligence asset at the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron level. The maneuver commander could increase the HUMINT planning, integration, and control capability of his battalion S2 sections with the additional OMT and increase his HUMINT collection capability with the addition of the three HCT's. The unity of effort and ability to focus his own organic intelligence assets on answering his battalion CCIR would provide timely and actionable intelligence that his tactical forces could exploit.

Battalion Scout Platoons

The scout platoon is the maneuver battalions' primary means of conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, and security missions. Scout platoons in an HBCT maneuver battalion and an IBCT maneuver battalion differ in equipment and number of personnel but perform the same function as being the eyes and ears of the commander on the battlefield. ISR operations in an urban environment require multidimensional reconnaissance about the enemy, terrain, society, and infrastructure. The HBCT and IBCT scout platoons can assist the battalion during urban operations by providing route clearance and route security missions, collecting detailed information about the terrain and infrastructure, and provide continuous surveillance on assigned areas of interest to locate the enemy and protect the populace. The HBCT and IBCT scout platoons do not have the resources or training to provide the detailed information requirements derived from human and open-source exploitations that an HCT provides.

The scout platoon in an HBCT maneuver battalion is manned by thirty 19D Cavalry Scouts and equipped with three M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs) and five M1114 Up-Armored HMMWVs by MTOE.

Table 3. HBCT Scout Platoon Assets					
Asset	M3	M1114	LRAS	Dsmnts	Pax
Plt HQ		2	1		6
Sections x 3	1	1	1	2	8
Total	3	5	4	6	30

The HBCT scout platoon has sufficient resources and training to conduct the battalion's reconnaissance and security missions. The HBCT scout platoon is highly mobile, has the armament to protect itself, and has the advanced optics and communication systems to obtain and report combat information in any environment. The HBCT scout platoon has limited dismounted capability and no enduring HCT assets. The HBCT scout platoon can provide a security element to protect the HCT, but cannot duplicate or replace the effectiveness of the HCT in collecting HUMINT. The HBCT scout platoons possess enhanced reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities with the Long Range Advances Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The LRAS3 provides a line-of-sight target detection and identification system that enables the scouts to operate well outside the range of currently fielded threat direct fire and sensor systems with 24 hour and adverse weather capability. The LRAS3 is a digital system that allows the scout to export tactical information about the enemy, environment, and local populace to the commander and staff through the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) system. The eight scout vehicles are also equipped with the FBCB2 system to provide enhanced situational awareness and rapid, accurate reporting.

The scout platoon in an IBCT Rifle battalion contains twenty-two 11B Infantrymen and is equipped with eight M1114 HMMWVs by MTOE. The IBCT scout platoon is not equipped with the LRAS3 advanced optics, only the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant HMMWVs have the FBCB2, and the platoon has no enduring HCT assets.

Table 4. IBCT Scout Platoon Assets				
Assets	M1114	LRAS	Dsmnts	Pax
Plt HQ	2			4
Sections x 3	2			6
Sniper Sqd	3		10	10
Total	11	0	10	32

The IBCT scout platoon has sufficient assets to conduct the reconnaissance and security missions in support of dismounted operations in urban terrain. The area the platoon operates in is much smaller than the mounted scout platoon of the HBCT. The IBCT scout platoon is most effective in a cordon role during urban operations by providing over watch and detailed enemy information from an OP. The IBCT scout platoon possesses a greater dismounted capability enhanced by a ten-man section of infantry snipers. The snipers provide an ISR capability to conduct continuous and extended surveillance on an assigned target or target location from long-term observation posts (OP). The snipers can perform special reconnaissance (SR) to assist with route security through continuous surveillance, provide information about the capabilities, intentions, and activities of the enemy, and provide detailed information about the specific characteristics of the complex terrain of an urban environment. The IBCT scout platoons can again provide a security element to protect the HCT, but cannot provide a HUMINT function with the same effectiveness as an HCT.

HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons

Although differing in terms of assets and capabilities, the HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons' have the mission to support the BCT during full spectrum operations with reconnaissance, surveillance, and security. The HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance squadrons' organization provide the ability to conduct the ISR operations throughout the width and depth of the BCT's area of operation (AO) during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The HBCT reconnaissance squadron can operate six combat outposts and secure 15-25 kilometers of routes. The IBCT reconnaissance squadron can operate four combat outposts and secure 10-20 kilometers of route. The HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance squadrons have the following capabilities:

- Providing all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely ISR in complex, close, and urban terrain
- Conducting close reconnaissance of threat forces by maximizing the teaming of HUMINT and ground-based sensor assets from the BCT's military intelligence company
- Gathering information about multidimensional threats, both conventional and unconventional
- Supporting targeting and target acquisition of the BCT using available ground and aerial assets
- Reducing risk and enhancing survivability by providing information that allows the BCT to avoid contact work to achieve overwhelming combat power if contact is necessary
- Assisting in shaping the operational environment (OE) by providing information or direct aim precision joint fires
- Fighting for information against light or motorized forces were heavier threats when augmented (FM 3-20.96, 1-14).

The HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron has four troops, the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), and three Ground Cavalry Troops (GCTs). Each GCT has two Scout Platoons and one section of two 120mm mortars with an attached Fire Support Team. The HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron organization is shown below in Figure 2 and the HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron assets are shown in Table 5.




Figure 2. HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Organization

Table 5. HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Assets				
Assets	M3	M1114	LRAS	UAV (Raven)
HQ	2			
Troops x 3	7	10	4	1
Total	23	30	12	3

The HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons are not being employed as a purely R&S asset for the BCT in Iraq. Due to the increased size of the BCT AOR, and the human intensive urban terrain, the reconnaissance squadrons are being used as a third maneuver element for the BCT and conducting the same offensive and security missions as the CABs and Infantry Battalions. Raids, cordon and searches, route security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted and dismounted patrols are the basic missions assigned to the HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons in Iraq.

The IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron has four troops, the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), two Mounted Cavalry Troops, and one Dismounted Cavalry Troop. Each Mounted Troop has three Scout Platoons and one section of two 120mm mortars with an attached Fire Support Team. The Dismounted Troop has two Scout Platoons, one seven-man sniper section, and one section of two 60mm mortars with an attached Fire Support Team. The IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron organization is shown below in Figure 3 and the IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron assets are shown in Table 6.




Figure 3. IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Organization

Table 6. IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron Assets					
Assets	M1114	LRAS	TOW	UAV (Raven)	Snipers
HQ	5				
Mntd Trps x 2	13	6	6	1	
Dsmntd Trp				1	7
Total	31	12	12	3	7

As previously mentioned, the HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons differ from the HBCT CABs and the IBCT Rifle Battalions in ISR assets and capabilities. First, the reconnaissance squadrons have a staff dedicated to ISR operations. The S2 section mirrors the maneuver battalions with the same number of eight personnel and structure, but focuses on the ISR collection planning, execution, and analysis during the reconnaissance, surveillance, and security missions when the reconnaissance squadron is operating as the BCT R&S asset. Secondly, the reconnaissance squadrons have specific personnel and equipment within their organizations to conduct ISR operations. The reconnaissance squadrons possess a more robust ISR capability with the enhanced optics, combat platforms, digital communications, and can employ dismounts throughout the BCT's AOR. However, the HBCT and IBCT Reconnaissance Squadrons still lack the increased staff analysis, OMT, and HCT assets and capabilities as the other HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalions.

Summary of ISR Assets

The HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons are stand-alone organizations capable of conducting full spectrum operations in an urban environment and in a dedicated AO. The current operations in Iraq often have the maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons operating in a non-linear, contiguous BCT AO. The BCT AO is generally large and the maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons may not be mutually supporting because of the dispersed urban centers. The BCT provides ISR support to its maneuver battalions from the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) to mitigate the lack of ISR assets and capabilities at the maneuver battalion level. The maneuver battalion commander does not own these

additional OMT and HCT ISR assets and cannot necessarily employ them as he determines to support his ISR operations. The task-organized OMT and HCT provide the maneuver battalion commander an increased HUMINT capability, but do not provide the commander with a dedicated HUMINT capability that he needs during continuous operations. “The bottom line is that every battalion TF needs the capabilities that THT brings to the battlefield; . . . all of this information is being lost on a daily basis because of lack of training and assets at battalion level” (Benson, 13). The task-organized or attached intelligence assets provided by the BCT are generally limited to one four-person HCT and limited UAV support to each maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron and may also include interrogation and translation support.

The process of employment of the intelligence asset is more of a staff planning and integration function instead of a command function. During urban operations, HUMINT is a critical capability that assesses the enemy, environment, and civil considerations that affect operations at the maneuver battalion level. The lack of an organic HUMINT capability at the maneuver battalion level degrades the effectiveness of the maneuver battalions conducting operations in an urban environment because the commander generally employs the ISR assets in support of the BCT operations and not his own. “While we cannot transform our hierarchical Army into a fully networked organization overnight, powering down to the lowest practical level will enable the most adaptive commanders to implement a solution” (Ollivant, 168). The commonality of the missions the maneuver battalions are conducting in Iraq requires a commonality of intelligence resources to effectively execute those missions in an urban environment. This intelligence organization currently exists in the HBCT and IBCT Military Intelligence

Company (MICO) and requires no personnel or equipment change to be a duplicated asset at the battalion level.

Training

The second research question addressed the quality and type of training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and unit leaders on the employment of ISR assets during urban operations and the overall intelligence process. How well the maneuver battalion commanders, staffs, and unit leaders understand the employment of ISR assets and the intelligence process in an urban environment can determine the success of the unit conducting urban operations in Iraq.

The assertion is the institutional and operational training focuses on the planning and execution of tactical task and employment of organic ISR assets and not on the integration of the HUMINT intelligence assets that can improve the effectiveness of the intelligence collection process in an urban environment. The assertion is based on personal experience from conducting urban operations in Iraq as a Ground Cavalry Troop Commander, and the conduct and planning of operations as a Squadron Plans Officer.

LTG Keith Alexander, Army G2, stated in an interview with the Army News Service, “Actionable Intelligence is not perfect intelligence - - commanders need to be trained on what intelligence can be reasonably delivered and what cannot; . . . one of the biggest shortcomings is the lack of human intelligence assets at the battalion and brigade level” (Burlas, 1). Training is the key to this understanding.

Institutional Training

The institutional domain of the U.S. Army training and leader development model from FM 7-0, *Train the Force*, consists of the Army schools. The maneuver leaders develop competencies in their warfighting skills through institutional training and education designed to enhance their military knowledge, individual potential, and initiative. The institutional domain teaches existing U.S. Army doctrine as the framework for developing leaders that are critical thinkers capable of full spectrum visualization, systems understanding, and mental agility. The Army needs adaptive, agile leaders that can think critically to frame and solve the complex problems faced in the urban environment. The integration of and effective use of the finite intelligence assets are instrumental in solving the complex problems that maneuver leaders face in an urban environment.

The institutional training for maneuver officers in the Officer Education System (OES) includes the Basic Officers Leaders Course III (BOLC III) and Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC). The Cavalry Leaders Course (CLC) and Scout Leaders Course (SLC) are additional functional training courses for maneuver officers to expand their ISR knowledge. The CLC and SLC functional training courses take the doctrinal theory of ISR operations and apply the doctrine to tactical level execution. Each course enables the maneuver officers to hone their ISR planning, employment, directing, and assessment skills during a three-week course of focused instruction and field training. The CLC is offered as a three-week resident course at Fort Knox, Kentucky or as a two-week Mobile Training Team (MTT) course at the units' home station. CLC is designed to train commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the rank of MSG through LTC who are

or will be serving in a cavalry unit. The SLC is offered as a three-week/three-day resident course at Fort Knox, Kentucky or as a three-week/three-day Mobile Training Team (MTT) course at the units' home station. SLC is designed to train cavalry leaders in the ranks of SSG through 1LT who are or will be serving in a scout platoon. The discussions of the OES training focuses on the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and unit leaders on the employment of ISR assets in an urban environment and on the overall intelligence process. The standard for training at the institutional level is that the training provides the maneuver officer with a general understanding about the intelligence process, the intelligence functions, and the intelligence assets he may integrate into his maneuver formations and operations. The maneuver officer should also be proficient in the conduct of ISR operations.

The Maneuver Lieutenants preparing to lead tactical formations in combat must be able to perform a series of individual and leader tasks in support of full spectrum operations. These critical tasks include but are not limited to –

- Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs)
- Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
- Tactical Movement (mounted and dismounted) in all terrain
- Fundamentals of the Offense
- Fundamentals of the Defense
- Conduct Reconnaissance and Security Operations
- Understand the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)
- Understand Urban Operations
- Integrate additional assets into the platoon formations and missions (Intelligence, Engineers, Military Police, etc.)

The Basic Officers Leader Course (BOLC III) is a 12-week course that trains lieutenants on small unit leadership, troop leading procedures (TLPs), and full spectrum operations at the platoon level in various environments. The training prepares the lieutenants to operate in the current operational environment (COE) and utilizes an experienced-based learning method that combines classroom instruction, instruction in a field environment, and hands-on training and execution. The BOLC III course is designed to train the lieutenants from subjects supporting the list of requirements listed above. The BOLC III course Memorandum of Instruction (MOI) provides the specific guidance for the subjects, time requirements, and resources required for each phase of the course instruction. Eight hours of classroom instruction are specific to the COE and focus on the aspects of the terrain, infrastructure, society, and enemy as they pertain to ISR operations. An additional 10 hours is devoted to teaching the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process. FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defines IPB as the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Understanding how to conduct effective IPB is important to being able to assess and understand the COE and its effect on operations.

The lieutenants at BOLC III receive 66 hours of urban operations and missions on urban terrain (MOUT) training culminating with a three-day field training exercise (FTX). The urban operations training objectives focus on platoon tactical tasks like cordon and search, clearing buildings, patrolling, and actions on contact. BOLC III also dedicates 128 hours of training to reconnaissance and security missions culminating with a four-day FTX. The reconnaissance and security training focuses on platoon R&S tasks that include route clearance and security, area reconnaissance, sensitive site security, and

establishing observation post. Based on the review of the current BOLC III MOI, my opinion is that the training is sufficient in preparing the lieutenants to conduct urban and ISR operations with their organic platoon assets. The MOI is limited in the integration of key military intelligence assets such as HUMINT that augment the overall mission execution and effectiveness.

Based on the review of the BOLC III course MOI, and my personal experiences and conversations with the officers who have completed BOLC III, the maneuver lieutenants receive sufficient training on how to shoot, move, and communicate. All but one of the tactical skills a lieutenant needs is mastered during BOLC III. There is a lack of integration training with additional assets, especially intelligence assets such as HUMINT. The platoon training focuses on the execution of actionable intelligence provided to the platoon by the intelligence functions, but without the integration and support of the HUMINT intelligence collection during their urban operations training in BOLC III.

The Maneuver Captains preparing to lead tactical formations in combat must be able to perform a series of individual and leader tasks in support of full spectrum operations. The shoot, move, and communicate tasks are similar to the lieutenants list, but increase in complexity due to the number of personnel they control and the size of their area of operations (AO). The Maneuver Captains must also be trained to serve on a battalion staff and have an understanding of the Military Decision Making Process.

The Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) is a 20-week course that prepares company grade officers for company command and staff assignments at the battalion and brigade level. The officers receive training on the fundamentals of tactics and doctrine of

full spectrum operations, IPB, military decision-making process (MDMP), and troop leading procedures (TLPs). The course also provides the training necessary to plan and execute company level full spectrum operations in various environments.

David Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," which appeared in *Military Review* in May 2006, are evident in the MCCC course curriculum. The officers receive 8 hours of specific and detailed classroom instruction on IPB (Article 1, Know your turf and Article 2, Diagnose the problem), 8 hours of instruction on ISR operations (Article 3, Organize for intelligence), an additional 12 hours on the COE and counterinsurgency operations (COIN), and urban considerations in the planning process (Article 25, Fight the enemy's strategy, not his forces).

The MCCC dedicates 12 hours of hands-on urban operations training conducted at a MOUT site designed to imitate the complex urban environment preparing them to conduct and control tactical operations at the company/troop level. The officers conduct 167 hours of practical application for the planning and execution of urban operations preparing them to serve as maneuver battalion staff officers and company/troop commanders. The course teaches the role of the military intelligence warfighting function but does not train the specific capabilities and employment of the military intelligence assets such as HUMINT. During the MOUT training, the urban operations do not integrate the specific intelligence assets that a company commander may have attached to support his urban operations in Iraq. Again, the MCCC students receive sufficient tactical training in an urban environment according to my review the MCCC MOI, but lack the understanding of the employment of HUMINT assets in an urban environment due to al

lack of collective training with the integrated HUMINT assets. Based on personal experiences with the maneuver officers that have completed MCCC, my opinion is that they are not fully trained on specific intelligence functions, assets, and capabilities needed to be successful during urban operations in Iraq.

Operational Training

The operational domain of the U.S. Army training and leader development model from FM 7-0, *Train the Force*, consist of the individual, collective, and leader tasks as they prepare for combat. The operational domain standards for training should be the integration of intelligence assets into the tactical operations. This standard should occur at the squad level and above during all collective training events.

The current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model by design provides a training model to train the individual, collective, leader, and multi-echelon training required for deploying units. The training model incorporated institutional and operational training opportunities to prepare deploying units for success in the contemporary operational environment (COE).

The Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) provides units a training focus early in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process when the unit is not assigned a directed mission. In the absence of a directed mission, the CMETL is based upon the mission and capabilities for which the organization was designed and resourced according to its Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE).

A General Mission Essential Tasks (GMETs) are three tasks that all Army units, regardless of type, must be able to perform during full spectrum operations in support of

the ARFORGEN. The tasks include: Conduct Command and Control (C2), Protect the Force, and Sustain the Force.

The Core Capabilities Mission Essential Tasks (CCMETs) are the mission essential tasks specific to a type of unit, which is designed and resourced according to a TOE and doctrine. The GMETs, plus the CCMETs, equals the CMETL. The CMETL taxonomy is shown below in Figure 4.




Figure 4. CMETL Taxonomy

Source: FM 7-0, Publication Draft, update briefing on 9 May 2008 from BCKS

The HBCT and IBCT GMETs are the same three CMETs as all other brigade-sized elements throughout the Army. The HBCT and IBCT CCMETs add four additional tasks to include: Conduct offensive operations, Conduct defensive operations, Conduct

stability operations, and Conduct security operations. The CCMET drives the further development of Task Groups, Collective Tasks, and Individual Tasks to focus the units training. An example HBCT CMETL listed below represents the Mission Essential Tasks and Task Groups that make up an HBCT CMETL:

- Conduct Command and Control
 - Plan an Operation
 - Prepare for an operation
 - Conduct an Operation
 - Execute and Operation
- Protect the Force
 - Conduct Area Security
 - Employ CBRN Protection
 - Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations
 - Employ Survivability Operations
- Sustain the Force
 - Conduct Logistics Support
 - Conduct Human Resource Support
 - Provide Health Services Support
- Conduct Offensive Operations
 - Conduct an Attack
 - Conduct a Movement to Contact
- Conduct Defensive Operations
 - Conduct an Area Defense
- Conduct Stability Operations
 - Conduct Information Operations
 - Establish Civil Security
- Conduct Security Operations
 - Conduct Security Operations (Screen and Guard)
 - Conduct Area Security Operations

The Mission Essential Tasks and Tasks Groups that make up the HBCT and IBCT CMETL drive the development of the individual and collective tasks the soldiers and subordinate units must train to prepare to conduct full spectrum operations. The collective and individual training tasks are linked to tactical mission requirements of their higher headquarters.

Individual training, collective training, and leader development are three methods of gaining operational experience. The individual training provides a basis in the development of skills specific to a certain job and position in any unit. A maneuver leader trains on the same individual warrior tasks as his soldiers before deploying for combat operations. Weapons proficiency for engaging targets, collecting and reporting intelligence information, and casualty treatment and evacuation are the basic skills developed at the individual level. The Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative trains soldiers too identify, understand, and report intelligence information during urban operations. FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*, (FOUO), discusses the Army's Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) initiative. The ES2 manual provides training on the fundamentals of human information collection at the tactical level by non-MI soldiers. The ES2 initiative does not attempt to replace the specific functions of an HCT, but rather to train all soldiers in contact with the population on human information collection through normal contact. The integration of the ES2 training into the pre-deployment collective training events would prepare soldiers to recognize human information collection opportunities, to conduct tactical questioning within their legal limits, and to identify and hand-over potential sources to the HCT during tactical operations.

The collective training provides the synchronization of the individual skills and leader skills to train unit level tasks focused on the organizations wartime mission. Combat arms units are required to focus on the collective competencies. Maneuver officers lead and train their units on the collective tasks associated with urban operations to include movement techniques, engaging targets, and entering and clearing a building. The associated maneuver leader tasks are to plan and conduct urban operations in accordance with FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*. The training integrates tactical site exploitation, detainee operations, and tactical questioning to train the intelligence process without any additional intelligence assets.

Major training exercises such as a situational training exercise (STX), field training exercise (FTX), and mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at one of the Army's combat training centers (CTCs) is the means by which commanders train and maintain the units technical and tactical proficiency through multi-echelon training. These training exercises provide the units and opportunity to conduct operations in a realistic tactical environment. It allows the commander to train the leader, collective, and individual tasks of his unit in a realistic combat environment. The emphasis of the STX training for Iraq is at the platoon and squad level. Urban operations require competency at the small unit level and therefore the training focuses on the individual and collective tasks required for a combat arms element to conduct operations in that environment. The maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron scout platoons focus on ISR tasks to include route clearance and security, establishing observation post, and reporting intelligence information. The FTX trains the maneuver officer and his unit on the planning and execution of tasks specific to urban operations to include cordon and search, critical site

security, and sphere of influence engagements with local leaders. The cavalry troops of the reconnaissance squadron train the same collective ISR tasks as the scout platoons but integrate the placement and security of HUMINT assets critical to urban operations. The integration of intelligence assets into the STX and FTX training is limited due to the specific training requirements of the specific intelligence functions. Critical Military Intelligence (MI) specific training must take priority over the collective training events. The MI personnel attend both resident and MTT courses to improve their MOS skills. The courses may include Modular Force Intelligence, HUMINT Collection, Tactical Questioning, and Enhanced Analysis and Interrogation training.

The BCTs deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan conduct a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) at one of the Army's CTC such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana or the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. The MRX is a BCT level training exercise to train the planning, employment, and synchronization of the BCT assets for tactical operations during full spectrum operations on varying terrain. The CTC replicates the complex urban centers of Iraq, tactical integration with host nation forces, an adaptive, thinking enemy, and joint and interagency capabilities. The BCT conducts ISR operations with organic assets to include R&S units, HUMINT, and UAV capabilities.

The BCT and battalion staffs train on specific FSO tasks to include Conduct MDMP, Perform IPB, Develop an R&S plan, Develop a collection management plan, Coordinate the ISR effort, and Access the tactical situation and operations. The tasks support multi-echelon and multi-functional urban operations. The maneuver units continue to focus on their collective tasks that support the battalion and BCT operations.

The intelligence staffs train on the analysis of combat information provided by the ISR operations to focus combat operations against the insurgent networks. The synchronization of the intelligence collectors and intelligence analyzers is a critical staff function. The BCT commander and staff gain valuable experience in the allocation of the BCT ISR assets to the maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons.

The MRE is generally the first pre-deployment training event that integrates all of the BCT's ISR assets during tactical missions. This is the premier training event for the entire BCT before deployment to Iraq and integrating all ISR assets into a collective training event where intelligence planning, collection, and analysis are trained. This training is generally in the ninth month of a twelve-month training cycle. The integration of ISR and specific intelligence assets and functions should begin with the STX and FTX to allow maneuver leaders to train on the employment and security of these finite assets.

The current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model by design provides a training model to train the individual, collective, leader, and multi-echelon training required for deploying units. The training model incorporated institutional and operational training opportunities to prepare deploying units for success in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Based on my review of the ARFORGEN training model, the operational training conducted during the ARFORGEN for units deploying to Iraq are sufficient to conduct effective full spectrum operations.

Doctrine

The third research question addressed the quality, availability, and clarity of the existing U.S. Army doctrine available to educate the maneuver battalion leaders about the urban environment, urban operations, and how ISR supports those urban operations.

The assertion is that the U.S Army doctrine does not provide the specific information a maneuver officer requires to understand the capabilities and effective employment of specific intelligence assets during urban operations. The assertion is based on the review of the existing U.S. Army intelligence, maneuver, and urban operations doctrine developed and distributed since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 through 1 May 2008.

U.S. Army doctrine provides a common framework of operations used for both planning and execution. The doctrine presents the fundamental principles on the employment of forces and organizational design. The doctrine also facilitates force tailoring for specific operations to promote initiative and flexibility. Finally, doctrine facilitates the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) across like units in the U.S. Army and provides a common language.

I developed the following standards to measure the quality, availability, and clarity of the existing U.S. Army doctrine for maneuver officers: (1) Does the existing doctrine provide specific information about the organization, capabilities, and limitations of intelligence assets? (2) Does the existing doctrine describe ISR operations and the intelligence process? (3) Does the existing doctrine define the urban environment (UE) and describe the effects on urban operations (OE)? (4) Does the existing doctrine provide tactical considerations for urban operations?

Intelligence Doctrine

The U.S. Army entered the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan with intelligence doctrine that focused on major combat operations and not on full spectrum operations.

Much of that doctrine remains in use even today. Four unclassified examples that allow unlimited distribution of such doctrine include:

- FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analyst*, March 1990
- FM 34-8-2, *Intelligence Officer Handbook*, May 1998
- FM 34-60, *Counterintelligence*, October 1995
- FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, July 1994

FM 2-91.6, *Soldier Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection*, October 2007 and FM 2-91.4, *Intelligence Support to Urban Operations*, March 2008, are replacing the older intelligence doctrine. The manuals are For Official Use Only (FOUO) but are worthy of mention as to the validity and availability of current intelligence doctrine to educate maneuver officers on ISR operations in an urban environment.

The U.S. Army's keystone manual for military intelligence doctrine currently available to aid maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and unit leaders understand the intelligence warfighting function and intelligence disciplines is FM 2-0, *Intelligence*. The FM provides the doctrinal guidance for the intelligence warfighting function and describes:

- The fundamentals of intelligence operations
- The operational environment (OE)
- Intelligence in unified action
- The Intelligence Warfighting Function
- The intelligence process

- Military intelligence roles and functions within the context of Army operations (2004, 1-14).

Understanding the relationship between the operations and intelligence processes is important to both maneuver officers and intelligence officers serving in a staff position. The greater understanding the staff officers have of both processes, the better the ISR integration process. Figure 5 shows the relationship between the processes.




Figure 5. The Relationship Between the Operations and Intelligence Processes

Source: FM 2-0, Intelligence (Washington, DC: HQ DA, April 2008), 4-2.

After reviewing FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, from a maneuver officer's perspective, my opinion is that the manual provides sufficient information about the intelligence disciplines and their roles in full spectrum operations, but lacks the specific details on the employment of military assets in support of tactical operations in urban terrain. FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, does not provide the maneuver officer with the specific information about the capabilities and limitations of intelligence assets he may have to employ as part of his element in urban operations. The intelligence manual is more beneficial to a staff officer for planning than a maneuver commander trying to exploit the tactical intelligence capabilities of the critical and finite intelligence assets. Maneuver officers will need to rely on their experience, intuition, and S2 section for the employment of distinct military intelligence disciplines.

One of the most critical ISR assets in an urban environment is HUMINT. FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, educates the maneuver officers on the organization and structure, support requirements, and employment considerations of HUMINT assets in an urban environment. The explanation of the capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of the remaining military intelligence disciplines is vague in my opinion. The maneuver officer can easily understand FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, and the manual provides an effective reference source for HUMINT operations and how they are integrated into the ISR process.

Maneuver Doctrine

Maneuver officers generally understand the reconnaissance and security missions detailed in the current U.S. Army maneuver doctrine as part of ISR operations and receive training on these missions as part of the OES. The intelligence component of ISR

is more complicated and not as easily understood because of the complexities of the intelligence disciplines and functions. The current maneuver doctrine in FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, and FM 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, provides information about intelligence synchronization by showing the relationship between the operations and intelligence processes as initially described in FM 2-0, *Intelligence*. The consistency of the information in both intelligence and maneuver doctrine provides a maneuver officer multiple sources of reference when planning ISR operations. This is an important point because of the amount of staff integration that must occur for successful operations in an urban environment. The maneuver doctrine describes ISR as a cyclic process designed to:

- Seeks to define what information is required
- Determine the best method to collect the information
- Allocate assets to gather the information
- Disseminate intelligence derived from that information to the commanders and staff
- Assess the value of the intelligence (2008, 4-4).

The maneuver officer must understand how an urban environment affects the ISR process. The degradation of his units ability to observe, gather, and communicate intelligence information is key to his tactical planning process. The need for actionable intelligence in an urban environment against an insurgency requires the maneuver officer to understand how intelligence operations support the ISR process. FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, and FM 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, and FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, provide the maneuver officer with specific information about

ISR operations and the intelligence process. FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, and FM 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, and FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, are easy to understand, but provide only tactical considerations in urban terrain and not solutions.

Urban Operations Doctrine

According to FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, the tactical tasks that a maneuver unit performs in an urban environment are consistent with the full spectrum operations (FSO) tasks performed on any other type of terrain. The tactical tasks include offensive, defensive, stability, and R&S operations. The effects on operations in the urban environment are important to understand. The urban environment is the most complex terrain in which units conduct operations. The greater understanding a maneuver officer has about the surface, subsurface, and supersurface complexities of this multidimensional urban battlefield the better he can plan and conduct operations within those complexities. The urban complexities include the terrain, infrastructure, and population. FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, is an outstanding current doctrinal reference for urban operations in my opinion as a maneuver officer. The manual explains, “Commanders and their staffs must do more than simply understand the impossible; rather, they must apply the art and science of warfighting to the urban environment and determine what it will take to make it possible” (2006, 4-1). The commander and his staff can do this effectively if they understand the potential effects that the urban environment has on each of the warfighting functions. FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, describes these difficulties. “The urban environment influences the intelligence function by degrading the reconnaissance capability, increasing the difficulty of the IPB process, increasing the importance of

credible HUMINT, and increasing the need for intelligence reach” (2006, 4-3). The urban environment has a similar impact on all six warfighting functions. The manual describes the possible effects of the UE on urban operations but does little to address the solutions. The complexities of the urban environment create a greater necessity to evaluate the operational risk against each warfighting function. FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, provides the commanders and staffs with risk considerations for the urban environment. Figure 6 defines risk management and lists these eight risk considerations:



Figure 6. Risk Management and the Associated Risk with Urban Operations

Source: FM 3-06, *Urban Operations* (Washington, DC: HQ DA, October 2006), 5-2.

The identification of the increased operational and tactical risk in an urban environment facilitates the planning to mitigate those risks. FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, is a valuable tool for maneuver officer to understand the increased risk in urban

operations and offers a solution. The manual describes how a maneuver officer conducting urban operations can mitigate these risks by applying the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of his combined arms assets to both protect the weaknesses and increase the strengths of his unit. Unified action with the host nation military, local police forces, civilian organizations, and joint forces can also mitigate these risks. The manual provides detailed information about the UE and the effects on combat operations in urban operations that a maneuver officer can use when conducting IPB.

Summary

The current maneuver and intelligence doctrine provides specific details about the intelligence assets available to a maneuver commander during urban operations. The capabilities, limitations, personnel, and equipment are discussed, but the integration of the assets and employment considerations are absent. The specific information about the intelligence assets organization, capabilities, and limitations is more helpful to the commanders and staff during the ISR planning process than the maneuver commander during his planning and execution of urban operations.

The research methodology attempted to assess the ISR assets and capabilities within a maneuver battalion, the training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and leadership on the employment of ISR assets, and the availability and value of doctrinal literature about the employment of ISR assets in and urban environment and urban operations. The assessment assisted with the development of the evidence necessary to formulate the conclusions and recommendations about the intelligence collection and dissemination in urban environments at the maneuver battalion level of organization and operation.

After an extensive review of the existing U.S. Army intelligence, maneuver, and urban operations doctrine from a maneuver officer perspective, my opinion is that there is sufficient intelligence, maneuver, and urban operations doctrine to educate and train maneuver officers to conduct full spectrum operations in an urban environment.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The research analyzed the intelligence organizations, training, and doctrine available to maneuver battalions in order to obtain that information dominance. The purpose of the research was to identify shortcomings in the intelligence organizations, training, and doctrine and to recommend solutions to alleviate the identified shortcomings.

This thesis concludes that maneuver battalions need more organic intelligence assets to conduct effective operations in an urban environment. The human intensive terrain of an urban environment requires additional assets to support maneuver and meet the commanders' extensive information requirements. The thesis also concluded that the training and doctrine are sufficient to educate, train and prepare maneuver officers to conduct urban operations in Iraq.

Assets and Capabilities

The first research question addresses the organization of the organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and inherent capabilities within the maneuver battalion and the reconnaissance squadron conducting urban operations.

The research focused on -

- the composition, capabilities, and functions of a HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) and Operational Management Team (OMT)

- the composition, capabilities, and functions of a HUMINT Collection Team (HCT) and Operational Management Team (OMT)
- the existing ISR assets and capabilities in the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron
- the existing Intelligence Section (S2) staff structure and capabilities

The research concluded that the amount of Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) greatly increases during urban operations due to considerations and effects of the population. Because most CCIR in an urban environment are based on human considerations, the HCT is the optimal intelligence collection asset for the battalion commander. The ability of the HCT to conduct human source operations, conduct tactical questioning, interrogate detainees, and conduct open source exploitation provides the battalion commander a specialized collection resource to answer the CCIR.

The addition of one S2X, 35E - HUMINT and CI Intelligence Officer, two additional 35M - HUMINT Collector, and two 35F - Intelligence Analyst, to the existing eight-man S2 section would provide an increased organic HUMINT capability for operations at the maneuver battalion level.

The CAB, Infantry Battalion, and Reconnaissance Squadron S2 sections also need to add one four-man OMT to plan, coordinate, and control the HCT activities in the battalion. The addition of this OMT would enhance the capabilities of the maneuver battalion S2 section by having a dedicated HCT management system to coordinate with the BCT intelligence assets for increased capabilities and effectiveness.

The seventeen-man S2 section would provide the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron commanders with a 24-hour intelligence support capability necessary during urban combat operations.

The HBCT and IBCT maneuver battalions and reconnaissance squadrons need to add three, four-man HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT's) controlled at the battalion or squadron level. The HCT's should be organic to the Maneuver Battalion or Reconnaissance Squadron Headquarters Company to provide administrative and support requirements. The battalion or squadron commander would have the ability to task the HCT's collection efforts based on the targeting process conducted by the battalion and squadron staffs.

The addition of this HUMINT section composed of an OMT and three HCT's that currently exists in the HBCT and IBCT Military Intelligence Company (MICO), would require no personnel or equipment changes and no change to the current doctrine for it to be a duplicated intelligence asset at the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron level. The HUMINT section is used to operating as one OMT controlling three HCT's during combat operations. With the HCT's under battalion or squadron control and located in the Headquarters Company, there is no requirement to add enough HCT's to provide on to every maneuver element in the battalion or squadron. Based on the size of the battalion/squadron AOR, the amount of intelligence assets available, and the human-centric CCIR that need answered, three HCT's are sufficient to provide the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron commanders with an effective HUMINT capability.

There is a requirement for only 1,458 additional MI personnel to fill these critical positions at the Army's current active duty strength and 2,364 MI personnel for the 2013 Army end-strength of 48 BCT's.

I recommend an increased HBCT and IBCT Maneuver Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron Intelligence Section (S2) from eight personnel to seventeen personnel with the addition of one S2X, 35E - HUMINT and CI Intelligence Officer, two 35M, HUMINT Collectors, two 35F, Intelligence Analyst, and one four-man OMT to provide the commander a 24-hour intelligence capability to support the battalion and squadron continuous operations.

The recommended increase in the battalion and squadron staffs and the addition of the OMT's are listed in Table 7.

Table 7. Recommended HBCT and IBCT Maneuver Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron Intelligence Staff Structure			
<u>MOS</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Required</u>	<u>Title</u>
S2 Section		3/0/10 = 13	
1 x 35D	O-3	1	S2 – Intelligence Officer
1 x 35D	O-2	1	Assistant S2
1 x 35E	O-2	1	HUMINT and CI Officer
2 x 35M	E-5	2 (1 Day/1Night)	HUMINT Collector
2 x 35F	E-6	2 (1 Day/1Night)	Senior Intelligence Sergeant
2 x 35F	E-5	2 (1 Day/1Night)	Intelligence Analyst Sergeant
2 x 35F	E-4	2 (1 Day/1Night)	Intelligence Analyst
2 x 35F	E-3	2 (1 Day/1Night)	Intelligence Analyst

OMT		0/1/3 = 4	
1 x 351M	CW2	1	HUMINT Collection Technician
1 x 35M	E-6	1	HUMINT Collection Sergeant
1 x 35M	E-4	1	HUMINT Collector
1 x 35M	E-3	1	HUMINT Collector
TOTAL		3/1/13 = 17	

Training

The second research question addressed the quality and type of training of the maneuver battalion commanders, staff, and unit leaders on the employment of ISR assets during urban operations and the overall intelligence process. How well the maneuver battalion commanders, staffs, and leadership understand the employment of ISR assets and the intelligence process in an urban environment can determine the success of the unit.

The research focused on -

- Institutional training of maneuver officers
- The operational training during the ARFORGEN cycle
- the existing ISR assets and capabilities in the maneuver battalion and reconnaissance squadron
- the existing Intelligence Section (S2) staff structure and capabilities

The standard for training at the institutional level is that the training provides the maneuver officer with a general understanding about the intelligence process, the intelligence functions, and the intelligence assets he may integrate into his maneuver

formations and operations. The maneuver officer should also be proficient in the conduct of ISR operations.

The research concluded that the institutional training that maneuver officers receive during the Basic Officers Leaders Course (BOLC III) and the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) is sufficient in educating and training maneuver officers to conduct maneuver and ISR operations in an urban environment. There is however, a lack of intelligence asset integration during the planning and execution of urban operations.

The operational domain standards for training should be the integration of intelligence assets into the tactical operations. This standard should occur at the squad level and above during all collective training events.

The operational training during the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) trains the individual, collective, leader, and multi-echelon tasks necessary to conduct full spectrum operations in an urban environment in Iraq. The training is planned and conducted based on the Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) for the HBCT and IBCT. The task groups, collective, and individual tasks drive the training throughout the ARFORGEN cycle through the completion of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE). Due to the need to train the specific MOS tasks of the intelligence functions, there is a lack of integration and training with the specific intelligence assets such as HUMINT during the STX and FTX collective training events.

The integration of the intelligence assets into the operational training events is affected by the limited amount of collective training due to the compressed ARFORGEN cycle that units currently face because of less than twelve months dwell time. There are

too many individual, collective, and multi-echelon training requirements to conduct during the ARFORGEN cycle to meet all of the standards in training.

I recommend the integration of intelligence assets such as HUMINT into the institutional and organizational training for maneuver officers. The integration of the intelligence assets early and often in the training will allow the maneuver officer to understand the capabilities, employment considerations, support requirements, and security needs the HCT's.

Doctrine

The third research question addressed the quality, availability, and clarity U.S. Army doctrine available to educate the maneuver battalion leaders about the urban environment, urban operations, and how ISR supports those urban operations.

The research focused on -

- Intelligence doctrine
- Maneuver doctrine
- Urban Operations doctrine

I developed the following standards to measure the quality, availability, and clarity of the existing U.S. Army doctrine for maneuver officers:

- Does the existing doctrine provide specific information about the organization, capabilities, and limitations of intelligence assets?
- Does the existing doctrine describe ISR operations and the intelligence process?

- Does the existing doctrine define the urban environment (UE) and describe the effects on urban operations (OE)?
- Does the existing doctrine provide tactical considerations for urban operations?

After an extensive review of the existing U.S. Army intelligence, maneuver, and urban operations doctrine from a maneuver officer perspective, it is my opinion that there is sufficient intelligence, maneuver, and urban operations doctrine to educate and train maneuver officers to conduct full spectrum operations in an urban environment.

FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, and FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, provide the maneuver officer a reference help understand the specific intelligence organizations, assets, and capabilities that support urban operations. The manuals are limited in the specific employment considerations of the HCT's.

FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, and FM 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, and FM 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance Squadron*, provide the maneuver officer with the specific considerations for the conduct of offensive, defensive, stability operations during full spectrum operations. The manuals also address ISR operations and the intelligence process. The integration and use of HCT's and other intelligence assets during urban operations is very limited.

FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, provides the maneuver officer with a detailed description of the urban environment and the urban environment effects operations. The manual stresses the need for additional maneuver and intelligence assets when conducting operations in the complex urban terrain. The manual describes the effects of the urban terrain on operations and the considerations during planning, but does not

provide the tactical recommendations needed by maneuver commanders conducting combat operations in an urban environment. After reviewing FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain*, as an initial reference for urban operations, FM 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, was released for distribution in April 2008. My opinion is that it superseded FM 3-06.11 for the purpose of my research.

I recommend the maneuver doctrine for operations at the battalion level and below address the integration of intelligence assets such as the HCT into the tactical formations and operations. The maneuver officers need a document to reference during training, planning, and execution of urban operations to understand the full capabilities of an integrated intelligence asset and employ them effectively. My opinion is that the addition of an Annex to FM 3-90.5, *Combined Arms Battalion*, which provided information about the integration of intelligence assets into maneuver operations, would be beneficial to a maneuver officer.

Conclusion

This study focused on the additional human intelligence requirements needed at the maneuver battalion level to conduct effective urban operations. Additional research on the technical intelligence functions still needs addressing. I recommend this topic for additional research to identify the type of equipment and systems that are necessary to improve urban operations.

GLOSSARY

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economical, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT). A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human resources.

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). An enabling operation that integrates and synchronizes all battlefield operating systems to collect and produce relevant information to facilitate the commander's decision making.

Operational Environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.

Special Reconnaissance (SR). Reconnaissance and Surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visualization or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

Urban Area. A topographical complex where manmade construction or high population density is the dominant feature.

Urban Environment. The physical area and the complex and dynamic interaction among its key components of the terrain, the population, and the supporting infrastructure as an overlapping and interdependent system of systems.

Urban Operations. Offense, defense, stability, and support operations conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent terrain where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features.

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